Concentrated risks in markets for credit default swaps (CDS) 
I. Introduction
The concentration of transactions and positions in credit default swaps (CDS) markets among a select group of large dealers is widely considered to have significantly contributed to the recent financial crisis. Due to the highly concentrated and interconnected nature of bilateral CDS contracting, the counterparty risk associated with potential defaults of large protection sellers is a potential source of systemic risk. Historically, the decentralized nature of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets has made it difficult for regulators and market participants to obtain reliable information about prices and market exposures. The lack of transparency with respect to exposures held by market participants complicates the management of counterparty risk. Reportedly, this was one of the reasons why, prior to the recent crisis, certain market participants like American Insurance Group (AIG) were able to create large, yet unobservable, exposures (e.g. Markrose et al. (2012) ).
To the extent that counterparty failures of a large swap market participant can result in sequential counterparty defaults and shock transmission through the swap market, the ensuing contagion can become systemically important. The U.S. Congress signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) into law on July 21 st 2010. The DFA envisioned a set of reforms that reasonably complete picture of inter-dealer transactions and positions. 8 A limitation of the data is that it does not provide information on transactions that fall outside the regulatory ambit of U.S. regulators, which are those transactions between two foreign counterparties on a foreign reference entity.
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To gain an understanding of the structure and conditions for stability and fragility of the CDS market, we map the network of connections between different dealers and non-dealers entities. Network-based approaches have been successfully used to study fragility and systemic risk of different markets. 10 Such approaches allow for the study of market structure of a market by capturing bilateral connections, evaluating their relative magnitude, and establishing important players as a way to understand systemic risk. Network approach is useful in studying dynamics of contagion, i.e., how a failure or decline of one financial institution can lead to the demise of other financial institutions and fragility of the whole market.
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We study the structure of the CDS market using explicit connections based on the total number of CDS transactions, the notional value of CDS transactions, and network diagrams. The end goal is to provide insights into the fragility and stability of the network, and study potential contagion among its participants. Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) provide some of the first formal models of financial contagion. To investigate the fragility of the system, we estimate several network measures for the system between dealers.
Counterparties transact in CDS contracts referenced to U.S. and international entities, corporate firms, and sovereigns. As a result, we separate CDS contracts into subgroups and provide summary statistics for the aggregate transaction activity of CDSs referencing sovereign, corporate financial and corporate non-financial entities. Financials and non-financials are separately reported because of the possible correlation between reference entities and CDS counterparties who are themselves financial institutions. Even though the lack of transparency prevents investors from understanding the extent to 8 Using a sample of 35 financial reference entities during the financial crisis period of 2007 , Shachar (2012 studies the role of dealers in providing liquidity. Using a snapshot on 30 December 2011 CDS positions data, Peltonen, Scheicher, and Vuillemey (2013) study the determinants of the network structure of CDS markets. Finally, using all CDS transactions occurring globally between May 1 and July 31 2010, where at least one G14 dealer was counterparty to the trade, Chen et al. (2011) analyze the aggregate market liquidity and trading activity in the CDS market. 9 The version of the database that has been provided by the DTCC includes all transactions that include at least one of the following: 1) a U.S. reference entity, 2) a U.S. counterparty, 3) a foreign branch of a U.S. counterparty, or 4) a foreign affiliate of a U.S. counterparty. This implies that neither foreign branches of U.S. counterparties nor their foreign affiliates are excluded. 10 See papers by Battiston, Deli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (2009), Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012) , Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) , Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, Tahbaz-Salehi (2013), and Deibold and Yilmaz (2013) . 11 Networks can be constructed using direct connections such as repayment of interbank loans (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, Tahbaz-Salehi (2013) ), interbank payment flows (Soramaki, Bech, Beyeler, Glass, and Arnold (2007) ), linkage of balance sheets (Shin (2008 ), municipal bond transactions (Li and Schurhoff (2012) ) and asset commonality (Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012) ), or indirect connections based on principal component analysis (PCA) or causality in equity returns (Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012) ) and CDS spreads (Billio, Getmansky, Gray, Lo, Merton, and Pelizzon (2013) ).
which interconnections amplify counterparty risk, market reactions after the failure of Lehman Brothers demonstrate the importance of understanding the magnitude of such correlations in the CDS market. In particular, when both the counterparty and the underlying CDS reference entity are financial institutions, a failure by a major counterparty may cause CDS spreads on other institutions to increase once protection sellers incorporate estimates of specific counterparty failures into CDS prices.
We provide a methodology to study the CDS market. Our approach considers the size, interconnectedness, and complexity of individual dealers and non-dealers entities and their interrelations, allowing us to assess potential systemic vulnerabilities of the CDS market. We also attempt to illustrate the importance of system-wide stress-testing approaches to evaluate vulnerabilities and the potential impact of destructive feedback loops. Such feedback loops can arise due to non-linear interconnectedness between dealers and non-dealers entities, where the distress of one dealer can lead to negative repercussions for other market participants which in turn feed back into further distress of that dealer. The approach we propose to evaluate interconnectivity should allow practitioners and policy makers to focus on the comprehensive benefits and costs associated with dealer interconnectedness.
This paper provides a set of statistics that characterize the CDS market, the degree of counterparty concentration, the size of different contracts, and the underlying contractual features. Preliminary findings show a high degree of interconnectivity among major market participants. Our findings are relevant in accessing the degree of potential contagion as risk is transmitted across market participants, and stability of the system. Future work will explore in detail some of the determinants of these linkages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of CDS contracts. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 discusses the reported metrics and our methodology for estimating interconnectedness. Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 discusses opportunities for future work, and Section 7 concludes.
II. CDS contracts
A CDS contract is a bilateral agreement that transfers credit exposure on a specific reference obligation of the reference entity between counterparties. The protection buyer makes periodic payments to the protection seller in exchange for a positive payoff when a pre-specified credit event occurs. 12 In this case, the seller of the CDS contract pays the buyer either the notional amount of the CDS contract against delivery of the reference obligation, or the difference between the notional amount and the 12 The International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA) has developed a standard legal documentation format for CDS contracts that includes a list of credit-event situations (ranging from bankruptcy to debt restructuring). Though contract counterparties are free to amend the ISDA definitions, the vast majority of CDS trades are covered by the standard ISDA documentation.
remaining value of the reference obligation as determined in an auction process, depending on whether physical or cash settlement is specified.
A party to a CDS contract may exit the contract through termination or novation. For a termination to occur both contract parties must agree to terminate, possibly for an additional payment that depends on current market conditions. A novation is executed by identifying a market participant that is willing to assume the obligation of one of the original counterparties at prevailing market prices. Other contract changes have been related to "compression" mechanisms, which are designed to cancel redundant contracts when counterparties have taken mutually offsetting positions. For example, if the same counterparties have entered into offsetting positions on contracts with the same economic terms, a compression trade cancels these contracts and creates a new contract with the same net exposure as the original contracts.
Selling protection through a CDS contract replicates a leveraged long position in bonds of the underlying reference entity, exposing protection sellers to risks similar to those of a creditor. By contrast, buying protection through CDS replicates a leveraged short position in the bonds of the underlying reference entity. This allows protection buyers to either hedge credit risk to which they may already be exposed or to effectively take a short position on the credit risk of the underlying reference entity.
Due to their bilateral nature, non-centrally cleared over-the-counter CDS contracts also expose each counterparty to a potential default by the other counterparty. From the perspective of a protection buyer, counterparty risk arises when the protection seller defaults and the buyer loses its protection against default by the reference entity. By contrast, the protection seller carries the risk that the buyer may default, depriving the seller of the expected revenue stream. Depending on the performance of the reference entity at the time of a counterparty default, the CDS contract may be more or less valuable than the original CDS and may therefore involve an unanticipated gain or loss. Thus, both holders of a CDS contract face the risk of losses in two ways. First, through the performance of the reference entity and, second, through potential counterparty default.
Standardized contractual features
The International Swap and Derivative Association (ISDA) has developed protocols related to contract standardization. The original Master Agreement was established in 1992 and revised in 2002. The primary purpose of these agreements was to create, among other considerations, standards for the netting and collateralization of contracts as well as the standardization of certain contract specifications such as contract tenors and credit event triggers.
In 2009, ISDA developed the so called "Big Bang Protocol," which introduced procedures to determine whether a credit event occurred and specified auction procedures for the pricing of defaulted bonds. ISDA also introduced contract standardization around maturity dates and premium payments (the fixed rates that determine the amount of the periodic payment). For example, CDS premiums were set at 100 or 500 basis points for U.S. contracts and at 25, 100, 500 or 1,000 basis points for European single name CDS. Since pre-specified premia will prevent contracts from having zero value on the initiation date, the contract typically requires upfront payments to compensate for the difference between the market and the standardized premia. Finally, a number of issues related to default triggers for European firms caused ISDA to issue the "Small Bang" protocol in July 2009. The protocol also applies to the handling of any globally outstanding CDS trades that have some form of restructuring specified. The motivations for the convention changes in European contracts are similar to the ones in the North American conventions -to facilitate central clearing, gain efficiencies in trade and operational processing and reduce the gross notional amount outstanding in the market.
III. Data Description
We use transaction data in single-name CDS submitted to the Trade Information Warehouse, a service offering operated by DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited ("DTCC-TIW"). We have access to all DTCC's Trade Information Warehouse data on CDS transactions except for solely foreign transactions. That is, our sample includes all transactions that include at least one of the following: 1) a U.S. reference entity, 2) a U.S. counterparty, 3) a foreign branch of a U.S. counterparty, or 4) a foreign affiliate of a U.S. counterparty. For example, transactions between two non-US counterparties are excluded from the analysis unless those two non-US counterparties have transacted in CDS where the reference entity is a US entity.
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The data identify the counterparties to each transaction. Each individual market participant has a consistent identifier throughout the dataset and a classification of its type (dealer vs. non-dealer entity) and its domicile. 14 The non-dealers entities sample includes pension funds, asset managers, hedge funds, banks, and non-financial companies (though the dataset does not distinguish between them). 14 This classification is based on DTCC's data. As such, the universe of dealers may not necessarily correspond to the same set of entities that the Commission will require to register as "Security Based Swap dealers". 15 Following the DTCC approach for reporting CDS gross and net notional amounts, we identify market participants based on counterparty family. A counterparty family will typically include all of the accounts of a particular asset manager or corporate affiliates rolled up to the holding company level. For more information: http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/products/derivserv/tiw_data_explanation.pdf Each transaction record contains the following information: the name of the reference entity, trade date, effective date, contract maturity date, the identities of the participating counterparties including the type (dealer vs. non-dealer entity), whether the transaction is cleared 16 , the executed notional amount, the market sector to which the reference entity belongs, and other transaction specific information. Transactions are classified into several types. A transaction can be a new trade, cash settlement of an existing trade, or can be novated.
17 Contracts can be partially or fully closed out or assigned/novated before maturity.
We apply a number of filters to the data. First, we eliminate index CDS and product/tranches CDS, thus leaving single-name corporate and sovereign CDS for analysis. 18 We then delete trades that have been re-assigned within a company and trades where a counterparty has completed a legal name change, while keeping contracts that are partially terminated and assigned. Erroneous records, such as negative notional amounts, also are removed from the data. Finally, we aggregate the names of the counterparties by the highest level name available. Specifically, we aggregate by parent name, fund name, or firm name if no higher level information is noted to better understand each counterparty's aggregate involvement in the CDS market.
IV. Methodology
We use several measures of connectedness to map out the network between dealers and non-dealers entities. To protect privacy of market participants, we anonymize the identity of the participant counterparties. This is primarily accomplished using several masking techniques when presenting our results.
To assess the systemic importance of dealers and non-dealers entities, we define the following simple measures of connectedness:
o Gross Notional Amounts. where i≠j, and 2 is the fraction of CDS purchases by a dealer or non-dealer entity from other dealers and non-dealers entities. N is the total number of market participants. By construction, the index can range from 0 to 1/(N-1). It takes the value 1 when a single counterparty buys 100% of its CDS contracts from only one counterparty, and approaches 1/(N-1) for the case where purchases are perfectly diversified across a large number of sellers. 19 The result is proportional to the diversification that each counterparty achieves in the long side of its portfolio (i.e. the CDS contracts bought).
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o Dealers Topology. We provide information relative to the overall bilateral exposure (aggregated for both long and short positions) between counterparties using network diagrams. The 19 In our case, to mask the identities of dealers and non-dealers entities, N represents 12 different entity groupings: the top 10 dealers, the set of all other dealers, and the set of all non-dealers entities. The concentration index, thus, ranges from 1/11 to 1. 20 Similarly, we construct a sell-side concentration index using, for each dealer and non-dealer entity i, the fraction of CDS contract sales to other dealers and non-dealers entities j. Notice that the concentration index is directional, i.e. buy-side concentration need not to be equal to sell-side. Because in our analysis buy-side and sell-side share similar results, we omit the latter for the sake of conciseness.
graphical representation of the network is characterized by bilateral relations across market participants based on gross notional calculations.
V. Results
This section describes the results of our empirical analyses. Although the calculations are presented on a highly aggregated basis that incorporates many reference entities and counterparties, we reduce the scope of the network connections by providing separate analyses that concentrate on different reference entities for CDS contracts.
Summary statistics
As of December 2012, there were 1,682 single-name entities referenced in outstanding CDS contracts. The gross notional value for all CDS contracts traded in 2012 is $4.8 trillion. At the end of the same year, contracts had a gross notional value outstanding of $11.97 trillion. Single-name corporate and sovereign CDS respectively represent 90.71% ($10.86 trillion) and 9.08% ($1.09 trillion). Table 2 indicates that the top 20 reference entities in terms of unique counterparties are either sovereigns or financial institutions. The reference entity that has attracted the most interest is the French Republic, which has 270 distinct counterparties. The second most popular reference entity is the Kingdom of Spain, which has 242 counterparties. For those reference entities that are outside the top 20, counterparty interest declines rapidly. Table 2 shows that the average number of counterparties for reference entities in ranking bins (21-100), (101-500) and (500-1682) drops monotonically from 85 to 45 to 12. 
Concentration
Since the data identifies buyers and sellers, Table 4 tabulates the number of contracts held by different buyers and sellers, aggregated across different size bins. Dealers represent majority of buyers and sellers by both the number of contracts and the gross notional amount. For example, the top 10 buyers and sellers of CDS are all dealers; however, non-dealers entities are represented in the top 20 buyers and sellers of the CDS contracts.
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., ECB (2009) and Peltonen, Scheicher, and Vuillemey (2013)), we find that the 5 largest buyers, by the number of contracts, are the counterparties for 44.08% of all contracts bought in 2012. Cumulatively, the top 10 and 20 buyers respectively represent 72.20% (44.08 + 28.12) and 85.77% (72.20 + 9.83 + 3.74) of all market activity in 2012. Based on our counterparty classifications, we observe that the top 10 buyers of CDS contract are all dealers. However, among the top 11-20 buyers (i.e. Tier 3 and 4), there are also some non-dealers entities.
Selling activity is even more concentrated. The top 10 sellers of CDS protection transact in 77.39% of all contracts traded in 2012, while the top 20 sellers capture 91.62% of all contracts sold. Similar to buyers, the top 10 sellers are all dealers, but there are some non-dealers entities in the top 11-20 sellers (i.e. Tier 3 and 4). The disproportionate amount of selling relative to buying suggests that non-dealers entities tend to be net buyers of protection and dealers are net protection sellers. (Table 4) , end-users allocate, at least some portion of their trades, across a fairly large set of non-dealers.
Next we tabulate the average number of contracts traded per counterparty. Table 6 demonstrates that buying and selling per day also is concentrated among the top 20 counterparties. The top buyers (sellers) transact on average 275.0 (300.2) contracts per day. Activity levels drop for counterparties that fall below the Tier 4 classification where the majority of counterparties buy or sell less than one contract per day. These results indicate that much of the activity is concentrated among a select number of counterparties. 22 We independently verify this claim by computing net notional amounts by counterparty type (i.e. dealers and non-dealers entities). As a whole, dealers have negative net notional (i.e. net sellers), while non-dealers entities have positive net notional (i.e. net buyers). We also report the number of connections for all of the remaining dealers (row 5) and non-dealers entities (row 6). We group into bins to preserve counterparty anonymity. Since we sort bin composition for each statistical category, bin membership may change for each statistic.
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Buy Side Connections Sell Side Connections
Buy and Sell Side Connections Table 6: This table reports Table 7 reports that Dealer 1 respectively buys 3.11% and 12.03% of its credit protection from Dealers 2 and 7. It also shows that 17.96% of Dealer 1's CDS protection purchases are to accommodate the demand of non-dealers entities.
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Based on our Concentration measure, we find that trading in sovereign CDS (Panel C) is more concentrated compared to corporate reference (Panel B) entities. Specifically, the Concentration index is 0.11 for All and Corporate reference entities, while it increases to 0.14 for Sovereign reference entities. The most noticeable changes are for dealers 1, 2, 4, 5, and 10. While all of these dealers appear to have diversified corporate CDS trading (buying substantial shares from all the other counterparties), their interactions with other dealers are more concentrated for their sovereign CDS transactions (they concentrate most of their buying from the remaining dealers 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9) . Tables 4, 5 , and 6, the top 10 counterparties for buys and sells based on number of contracts and the gross notional amount calculations are all dealers. 24 By construction each row sums up to 100%. Columns do not need to sum up to 100%. 25 The network of sell relationships has similar results. Results are not reported but available upon request. Billio, Getmansky, Gray, Lo, Merton, and Pelizzon (2013) find that credit risk of financial institutions and sovereigns is highly interrelated. Our results imply that geographical proximity may be an important attribute of trading in the market for sovereign CDS. That is, dealers tend to concentrate their trades with counterparties belonging to different geographical areas while reducing their participation with counterparties located in closer proximity.
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In the final step, we provide a graphical representation of the network by characterizing the bilateral relations across all market participants. For each bilateral relation, we first sum the notional amount that counterparty i buys from j and the amount that i sells to j (which is equivalent to the amount j sells to i and j buys from i, respectively). To anonymize our results, we first "sterilize" our data by classifying bilateral notional amounts into six equally sized bins. 26 We then proceed to compute the average of each bin and then use the average notional amount for that bin rather than the exact bilateral amount. The practical implication of this filtering process is to translate raw notional amounts into six different connection sizes. By doing this, even if we are not able to preserve the exact ranking of the exposures (different raw notional amounts belonging to the same bin would be converted to the same number), we retain valuable information on the size of the exposures without necessarily providing direct information on raw notional amounts that could make identification of specific dealers possible.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 capture the overall gross notional amount traded between counterparties identified in Table 7 . The thickness of connections between two dealers is indicative of the notional amount of CDS contracts traded. Every dealer bilateral relation that is classified within a particular bin is assigned the same thickness in the figures. Dealer relations that fall into bins with larger notional amount of contracts traded are represented by thicker lines. The size of the nodes reflects the overall amount traded by the specific counterparty.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 clearly show that the network is neither random nor sparse. In all three graphs, nondealers entities seem to entertain most of the first and second order size connections with the top 10 dealers. The network for sovereign CDS appears to be characterized by larger discrepancies between node connections. By contrast, the network for corporate CDS seems to be more homogenous with more connections of similar size. These results are consistent with what we found in Table 7 . 26 The thickness of the bins depends of the volume of the specific market we are taking into consideration. For all CDS contracts the bins are 50 billion dollars, for corporate they are 25 billion, and for sovereign they are 16.7 billion. 
VI. Future Direction of Work
So far our analysis has focused on gross notional amounts. The first step forward will be to compute net notional amounts. For a particular reference entity, the net notional of a counterparty is the sum of the gross notional amounts of protection bought less the sum of the gross notional amounts of protection sold on that reference entity. If protection sold exceeds protection bought, the net notional will be negative. Because the net economic exposures of all market participants must sum to zero, net notional outstanding for the reference entity is the sum of the net protection bought by net buyers (or equivalently net protection sold by net sellers). Aggregate net notional data is the sum of net protection bought (or equivalently sold) across all counterparties. Compared to gross notional, net notional allows for differentiation of market participants between net buyers and net sellers to best reflect the size of credit risk transferred and counterparty risk.
Another high priority moving forward is to incorporate positions data into our analysis. It would be important to check whether the network picture changes moving from transactions to positions data. A possible result could be that although the largest ten dealers transact approximately 75% of CDS notional volume, they may hold a smaller share of CDS positions.
Other Dealers
Non-dealers
In our analysis, so far, we do not distinguish between contracts that are considered cleared, clearable, or non-cleared transactions. In future versions of our work we are planning to separate contracts into clearable but not cleared, clearable and cleared, and non-clearable and, for each, conduct separate network analyses.
Finally, moving forward, we intend to provide a dynamic picture of the network. So far we employed exclusively 2012 transaction data providing a static picture of the CDS market and its network. In the future we will work with time-series data to study the dynamics of network relationships form 2006 to 2012.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper we study the opaque over-the-counter market of credit default swaps (CDS). Using network methodology, we are able to map the network of interconnectedness between dealers and non-dealers entities of CDS contracts. We find that the network of dealers is highly concentrated for different kinds of CDS contracts. We find that trading in sovereign CDS is more concentrated compared to corporate reference entities. As progressively more contracts are cleared, it is important to study network relations for clearable and cleared contracts to see whether risk is being concentrated in certain entities. Understanding the dynamics of network topology and the effect of an eventual migration to central clearing on dealer interconnectedness will provide a broader understanding of the fragility and potential contagion of the CDS network. This will help regulators and academics identify factors necessary to prevent network fragility.
